Gonen Segev , The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process . On September 13, 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization (P L O) Negotiator Mahmoud Abbas signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, commonly referred to as the “Oslo Accord,” at the White House. Israel accepted the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace. Both sides agreed that a Palestinian Authority (PA) would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over a five-year period. Then, permanent status talks on the issues of borders, refugees, and Jerusalem would be held. While President Bill Clinton’s administration played a limited role in bringing the Oslo Accord into being, it would invest vast amounts of time and resources in order to help Israel and the Palestinians implement the agreement. By the time Clinton left office, however, the peace process had run aground, and a new round of Israeli-Palestinian violence had begun. In November 1995, Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, an Israeli who opposed the Oslo Accords on religious grounds. Rabin’s murder was followed by a string of terrorist attacks by Hamas, which undermined support for the Labor Party in Israel’s May 1996 elections. New Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu hailed from the Likud Party, which had historically opposed Palestinian statehood and withdrawal from the occupied territories. In Israel’s May 1999 elections, the Labor Party’s Ehud Barak decisively defeated Netanyahu. Barak predicted that he could reach agreements with both Syria and the Palestinians in 12 to 15 months, and pledged to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. In September, Barak signed the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum with Arafat, which committed both sides to begin permanent status negotiations. An initial round of meetings, however, achieved nothing, and by December the Palestinians suspended talks over settlement-building in the occupied territories. Barak then focused on Syria. In January 2000, Israeli, Syrian, and U.S. delegations convened in West Virginia for peace talks. These negotiations foundered when Barak refused to reaffirm Rabin’s pledge to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 line, arguing that none of the concessions offered by the Syrian delegation in return could be considered final, since Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was not present. A subsequent meeting between Clinton and Asad in Geneva failed to produce an Israeli-Syrian accord. Barak then withdrew Israeli forces unilaterally from Lebanon and returned to the Palestinian track. At the prime minister’s insistence, Clinton convened a summit at Camp David in July 2000, where he, Barak, and Arafat attempted to reach a final agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Accounts differ as to why Camp David failed, but it is clear that despite additional concessions by Barak, the Israelis and Palestinians remained strongly at odds over borders, Jerusalem, and whether Israel would recognize Palestinian refugees’ “right of return.” The summit ended without a settlement; Clinton would blame Arafat for its failure. https://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=170 https://ng.linkedin.com/pub/dir/Gonen/Segev https://glosbe.com/en/he/Gonen%20Segev https://www.facebook.com/gonen.segev http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-357665 http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-357667 http://il.linkedin.com/pub/dir/Gonen/Segev https://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByMinistry_eng.asp?ministry=4